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EXECUTIvE SUMMARY 
The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 Act Annual Report 2013–14 
sets out how eligible Commonwealth, State and Territory government agencies have 
used the powers available under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 
1979 (the TIA Act) between 1 July 2013 and 30 June 2014. 
The primary function of the TIA Act is to protect the privacy of the communications 
of people who use the Australian telecommunications network. Law enforcement 
agencies’1 use of interception powers under the TIA Act is independently overseen by 
the Commonwealth Ombudsman and equivalent state bodies. 
The TIA Act provides a legal framework for national security and law enforcement 
agencies to access the information held by communications providers that 
agencies need to investigate criminal offences and other activities that threaten 
safety and security. 
Serious and organised criminals and persons seeking to harm Australia’s national 
security, routinely use telecommunications service providers and communications 
technology to plan and to carry out their activities. Some activities, including child 
pornography, are predominantly executed through communications devices such as 
phones and computers. 
Legislative reforms
This 2013–14 annual report contains reports on three ‘eligible authorities’2 under the 
TIA Act created by an amendment to the TIA Act during the 2012–13 reporting period. 
These new eligible authorities are the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption 
Commission (victoria), the victorian Inspectorate, and the Independent Commissioner 
Against Corruption (South Australia).
Key judicial decisions
This 2013–14 annual report contains two decisions from courts in South Australia and 
Western Australia. These decisions relate to provisions in the TIA Act dealing with 
notifying a carrier of the issue of a warrant and exempt proceedings.
1 An ‘enforcement agency’ is broadly defined to include all interception agencies as well as a body whose 
functions include administering a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or administering a law relating to the 
protection of the public revenue. 
2 Eligible authorities can access information obtained under telecommunications interception warrants and 
can be declared by the Commonwealth Attorney-General to be an interception agency (subject to being 
satisfied that the requesting State has met the preconditions in section 35 of the TIA Act).
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Policy developments
There were two inquiries during the 2013–14 reporting period:
• the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Reference Committee Inquiry 
into a comprehensive revision of the TIA Act with regard to two particular 
recommendations3
• the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee Inquiry into 
the Telecommunications Amendment (Get a Warrant) Bill 2013.
Key findings
• In 2013–14, issuing authorities issued 4,007 interception warrants, a decrease 
of around 5 per cent from 2012–13, when 4,232 warrants were issued. 
Interception warrants are highly privacy intrusive and are only sought when 
operationally necessary. 
• During 2013–14, information obtained under interception warrants was used in:4
 – 2,938 arrests
 – 4,008 prosecutions
 – 2,210 convictions.
• In 2013–14, 77 enforcement agencies made 334,658 authorisations for 
the disclosure of historical telecommunications data. Of these, 324,260 
authorisations were made to enforce a criminal law. This compares with  
330,798 data authorisations made by 73 enforcement agencies in 2012–13, 
of which 320,032 authorisations were made to enforce a criminal law  
(a 1.3 per cent increase from 2012–13). A total increase of 1.2 per cent is 
significantly less than the previous reporting period. In 2012–13 around  
9.8 per cent more authorisations were made than in 2011–12. 
• In 2013–14, 139 B-Party warrants5 were issued, around 16 per cent more  
than in 2012–13. Around 10 per cent of these warrants were issued with 
conditions or restrictions.
• In 2013–14, 999 named person warrants were issued, a 12 per cent increase 
from 2012–13. The increase is consistent with fluctuations associated with 
operational demand (between 2011–12 and 2012–13 there was a 28 per cent 
increase in the number of named person warrants issued).
3 a. the recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission For Your Information: Australian Privacy 
Law and Practice report, dated May 2008, particularly recommendation 71.2; and b. recommendations 
relating to the Act from the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security Inquiry into the 
potential reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation report, dated May 2013.
4 These figures provide an indication about the effectiveness of interception, rather than the full picture, as, 
for example, a conviction can be recorded without entering intercepted information into evidence. 
5 A B-Party warrant is an interception warrant that enables an interception agency to intercept the 
communications of a person who is communicating with a person suspected of involvement in a 
serious offence.
E X E C U T I v E  S U M M A R Y   |  I X
• In 2013–14, law enforcement agencies made 153 arrests, conducted 176 
prosecutions and obtained 144 convictions based on evidence obtained under 
stored communications warrants.6
• In 2013–14, consistent with the last reporting period, the majority of 
named person warrants were for the interception of between two to five 
telecommunications services.
• During the reporting period the Commonwealth Ombudsman conducted 
six inspections of the interception records of the ACC, ACLEI and the AFP 
(two inspections for each agency). 
• The Ombudsman found that there continued to be a high level of compliance with 
the telecommunications interception provisions of the TIA Act and that agencies 
were cooperative with inspections and receptive to suggestions for improvement. 
Telecommunications interception
Accessing content, or the substance of a communication—for instance, the message 
written in an email, the discussion between two parties to a phone call, the subject 
line of an email or a private social media post—without the knowledge of the person 
making the communication is highly privacy intrusive and, under the TIA Act, can 
only occur under an interception or stored communications warrant, or in certain 
limited circumstances such as a life-threatening emergency. Interception is subject to 
significant limitations, oversight and reporting obligations and the annual report is an 
important part of this accountability framework. 
Lawful interception is an effective investigative tool that supports and complements 
information obtained through other methods. In many cases, the weight of evidence 
obtained through telecommunications interception results in defendants entering 
guilty pleas, thereby eliminating the need for the intercepted information to be 
introduced into evidence. 
Telecommunications data
A critical tool available under the TIA Act is access to telecommunications data.7
Telecommunications data is often the first source of lead information for further 
investigations, helping to eliminate potential suspects and to support applications for 
more privacy intrusive investigative tools including search warrants and interception 
warrants. For example, an examination of call charge records can show that a potential 
person of interest has had no contact with criminals being investigated.
Data gives agencies a clear method for tracing all telecommunications from end-to-end 
and can also be used to demonstrate an association between people or to prove that 
two or more people spoke with each other at a critical point in time (such as before the 
commission of an alleged offence). 
6 These figures provide an indication about the effectiveness of interception, rather than the full picture, as, 
for example, a conviction can be recorded without entering intercepted information into evidence. 
7 Telecommunications data is information about a communication, such as the phone numbers of the 
people who called each other, how long they talked to each other, the email address from which a 
message was sent and the time the message was sent.
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Access to telecommunications data is regulated by Chapter 4 of the TIA Act, which 
permits authorities or bodies that are an ‘enforcement agency’ under the TIA Act to 
authorise telecommunications carriers to disclose telecommunications data where 
that information is reasonably necessary for the enforcement of the criminal law, a law 
imposing a pecuniary penalty, or the protection of the public revenue. All interception 
agencies are also enforcement agencies as well as authorities or bodies whose 
functions include administering a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or administering a 
law relating to the protection of the public revenue. 
Under the TIA Act, all enforcement agencies can access historical data8 and criminal 
law-enforcement agencies can also access prospective data9. 
This annual report is organised into three main chapters: chapter 1 focuses on 
interception warrants, chapter 2 reports on stored communications, and chapter 3 
deals with telecommunications data. 
The TIA Act is available online at <www.comlaw.gov.au> 
8 Historical data, also known as existing data, is information that is already in existence when an 
authorisation for disclosure is received by a telecommunications carrier. 
9 Prospective data is telecommunications data that comes into existence during a period of time in which  
an authorisation is in force.
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CHAPTER 1
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION
The primary function of the TIA Act is to protect the privacy of the communications of 
people who use the Australian telecommunications network by making it an offence 
to intercept communications, subject to limited lawful exceptions. Under the TIA Act, 
communications cannot be intercepted while they are passing over the Australian 
telecommunications system, except as authorised in the circumstances set out in the 
TIA Act. 
Definition
The term ‘interception agency’ is defined in section 5 of the TIA Act and is limited 
to agencies such as the Australian Federal Police and state police forces eligible 
to apply under Part 2–5 of the TIA Act for an interception warrant.
Key legislative developments 2013–14
New interception agencies under the TIA Act
In the 2012–13 reporting period, the Telecommunications Interception and Other 
Legislation Amendment (State Bodies) Act 2012 (the TI State Bodies Act) amended the 
TIA Act to add the following agencies as ‘eligible authorities’ under the TIA Act:
• the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (victoria) (the IBAC)
• the victorian Inspectorate 
• the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (South Australia)  
(the ICAC (SA)).
Eligible authorities can access information obtained under telecommunications 
interception warrants and can be declared by the Commonwealth Attorney-General to 
be an interception agency (subject to being satisfied that the requesting State has met 
the preconditions in section 35 of the TIA Act). 
The IBAC became an interception agency on 10 February 2013, when it replaced the 
victorian Office of Police Integrity. The 2013–14 Annual Report contains the first full year 
of reporting information about the IBAC. The ICAC (SA) became an interception agency 
on 1 September 2013 and information in this annual report about the ICAC (SA) relates 
to that time period. Consistent with powers available to other state oversight bodies, the 
victorian Inspectorate is not an interception agency.
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Key judicial decisions 2013–14
Notification of the issue of a warrant
In R v Scarpantoni (No 2) [2013] SADC 70 (22 May 2013), the District Court of South 
Australia followed the reasoning of the Western Australia Court of Appeal in Geldert v 
The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 226 (9 November 2012) that, where there is 
a valid warrant, there is no requirement for the service of a certified copy of the warrant 
to be a precondition to the agency’s authority to commence interception. Notification to 
the carrier is the means by which the carrier can commence doing what it is required to 
do to facilitate the interception of the communications by the officers of the agency. 
The court found, provided that the carrier has been informed of the issue of the warrant, 
the carrier did not also require the certified copy in order to commence the interception. 
The requirement to provide a certified copy of the warrant was to provide an audit trail 
and underpinned the accountability and reporting obligations in the Act, rather than a 
necessary part of notification to the carrier.
Geldert v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 226 (9 November 2012) rejected 
the judgments in The State of Western Australia v Tanevski [No 5] [2012] WADC 64 
(Tanevski No 1) and The State of Western Australia v Tanevski [2012] WADC 87 (Tanevski 
No 2). In those cases, the WA District Court of Western Australia considered the 
notification and authorisation provisions in relation to stored communications warrants 
(sections 121 and 126) and telecommunications service warrants (sections 47 and 
60) respectively. The court held that the process for notifying a carrier of a stored 
communications (Tanevski No 1) or interception warrant (Tanevski No 2) required the 
agency to provide a certified copy, in addition to informing the carrier of the warrant. 
Exempt proceedings
In Sands v State of South Australia [2013] SASC 44, the Supreme Court of South Australia 
determined that certain intercepted conversations were admissible in a claim for 
defamation as the proceeding related to the ‘alleged misbehaviour, or alleged improper 
conduct, of an officer of the Commonwealth or of a State’. 
The defamation claim in Sands was based on an allegation that the police had acted 
unlawfully, maliciously and in breach of their statutory duties in the course of the 
investigation by leaking information to a journalist that identified the plaintiff as the 
primary murder suspect. 
The Supreme Court distinguished the narrower construction in Kizon v Palmer (1997) 
72 FCR 409, which found that a proceeding relating to ‘alleged misbehaviour, or alleged 
improper conduct, of an officer of the Commonwealth or of a State’ referred to alleged 
misbehaviour or improper conduct of a kind commonly associated with disciplinary 
action against an employee or office-holder, such as dismissal, removal from office or 
other sanction. 
The Court found that amendments to the definition of ‘exempt proceeding’ in section 
5B of the TIA Act, which were made after the Kizon decision, together with the phrase 
‘any other proceeding’ in subsection 5B(1)(f), brought the current proceedings within the 
TIA Act. The foundation of the defamation claim was that the police acted unlawfully, 
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maliciously and in breach of their statutory duty, allegations that could lead to 
disciplinary or criminal charges. 
The Court also considered that the intercepted conversations were admissible on the 
basis that the material had previously been admitted in an earlier proceeding. Under the 
TIA Act, lawfully intercepted information that has been given in evidence in a previous 
proceeding can subsequently be given in evidence in any proceeding (section 75A of the 
TIA Act). 
Key policy developments 2013–14
Senate inquiry into the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Act 1979 
On 12 December 2013, the Senate referred the following matter to the Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs References Committee (the References Committee) for inquiry 
and report:
Comprehensive revision of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Act 1979 (the Act), with regard to:
a. the recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission For Your 
Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice report, dated May 2008, 
particularly recommendation 71.2; and
b. recommendations relating to the Act from the Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Intelligence and Security Inquiry into the potential reforms of Australia’s 
National Security Legislation report, dated May 2013.
The Attorney-General’s Department made a submission to the inquiry, a copy of which 
can be found online at <www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/
Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Comprehensive_revision_of_TIA_Act> 
In its submission, the department welcomed the current inquiry and reiterated the 
relevance of the issues raised by the department in its submission to the 2012–13 
Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation by the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (the PJCIS). 
The References Committee released its report on 24 March 2015, a copy of which can be 
found online at <www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_
and_Constitutional_Affairs/Comprehensive_revision_of_TIA_Act>
Senate inquiry into the Telecommunications Amendment (Get a Warrant) 
Bill 2013
On 20 June 2013, the Senate referred the Telecommunications Amendment (Get a 
Warrant) Bill 2013 (the Bill) to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation 
Committee (the Legislation Committee) for inquiry and report by 31 October 2013.
The Bill sought to amend the TIA Act to require law enforcement and national security 
agencies to obtain a warrant to access telecommunications data. 
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The Legislation Committee received 18 submissions from government agencies and 
community organisations. The Attorney-General’s Department made a submission to 
the inquiry, a copy of which can be found online at <www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_
Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Completed_
inquiries/2010-13/getawarrant2013/submissions>
The department’s submission noted that, if enacted, the Bill would significantly 
affect the ability of law enforcement and national security agencies to perform their 
legislated roles.  
On 5 August 2013, the Governor-General prorogued the 43rd Parliament and dissolved 
the House of Representatives (a Federal election was held on 7 September 2013). On 
20 August 2013 the Legislation Committee wrote to the President of the Senate advising 
that, consistent with the general approach adopted by other Senate committees to 
inquiries during elections, the Legislation Committee had resolved not to continue its 
inquiry into the Bill. 
More information 
Further information about telecommunications, interception and privacy law can be 
found at:
• Attorney-General’s Department <www.ag.gov.au/> 
• Department of Communications <www.communications.gov.au/> 
• Commonwealth Ombudsman <www.ombudsman.gov.au/> 
• Office of the Australian Information Commissioner <www.oaic.gov.au/> 
• Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman <www.tio.com.au/> 
• Australian Communications and Media Authority <www.acma.gov.au/>
The TIA Act provides for several separate warrants for law enforcement agencies to 
access the content of a communication, including warrants relating to accessing  
real-time content (for example, a phone call while the parties are talking with each 
other) and a warrant to access ‘stored communications’ (including emails and text 
messages accessed from the telecommunications carrier after they have been sent). 
During the reporting period interception warrants were only available to 17 
Commonwealth, state and territory agencies including:
• ACC, ACLEI and AFP
• State and Territory Police, and
• State anti-corruption agencies.
A full list of the agencies able to obtain an interception warrant is provided in Appendix B.
C H A P T E R  1  |  5
Serious offences
Interception warrants can only be obtained to investigate serious offences. Serious 
offences generally carry a penalty of at least seven years’ imprisonment. 
Serious offences for which interception can be obtained under the TIA Act include 
murder, kidnapping, serious drug offences, terrorism, offences involving child 
pornography, money laundering, and offences involving organised crime. 
In the 2013 report Organised Crime in Australia, the Australian Crime Commission (the 
ACC) assessed the overall risk to Australia from organised crime as high10 and estimated 
the cost to Australia of organised crime such as identity crime, money laundering, fraud, 
cybercrime, drug trafficking and people smuggling at $15 billion per year.11 
The information provided in Table 1 illustrates the important role telecommunications 
interception plays in investigating serious crimes. Consistent with previous years, in 
2013–14 agencies obtained the majority of warrants to assist with investigations into 
serious drug offences (1,772 warrants). Loss of life or personal injury offences were 
specified in 624 warrants and 447 warrants related to murder investigations. Organised 
crime was specified as an offence in 246 warrants. The total number of offences is 
typically larger than the total number of warrants issued as warrants can be issued to 
investigate more than one serious offence. 
Information about the serious offences covered under each category of serious offence 
set out in the first column of Table 1 is provided in Appendix D.
10 ACC, Organised Crime in Australia 2013, www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/ACC%20
OCA%202013.pdf, p. 12
11 ACC, Organised Crime in Australia 2013, p. 6.
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Eligibility to issue an interception warrant 
An interception warrant may only be issued by an eligible Judge or a nominated 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) member. Table 2 shows that in 2013–14 there 
were 80 issuing authorities.
An eligible judge is a judge who has consented in writing and been declared by the 
Attorney-General to be an eligible judge. In the reporting period, eligible judges 
included members of:
• the Federal Court of Australia
• the Family Court of Australia
• the Federal Circuit Court. 
A nominated AAT member is a deputy president, senior member or member of the 
AAT who has been nominated by the Attorney-General to issue warrants. 
Table 2: Availability of Federal Court Judges, Family Court Judges, Federal Circuit Court 
Judges and nominated AAT Members to issue telecommunications interception warrants— 
s. 103(ab)
Issuing authority Number eligible
Federal Court judges 11
Family Court judges 7
Federal Circuit Court judges 33
Nominated AAT members 29
Before issuing an interception warrant the authority must be satisfied that:
• the agency is investigating a serious offence
• the gravity of the offence warrants the intrusion into privacy
• the interception is likely to support the investigation.
Applications for and issue of telecommunications 
interception warrants
Tables 3 and 4 set out information about the number of eligible judges and nominated 
AAT members and the agencies to which they issued warrants. In 2013–14, issuing 
authorities issued 4,007 interception warrants, a decrease of around 5 per cent from 
2012–13, when 4,232 warrants were issued. Interception warrants are highly privacy 
intrusive and are only sought when operationally necessary. 
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Table 3: Number of telecommunications interception warrants issued by Federal Court 
judges, Family Court judges, Federal Circuit Court judges and nominated AAT members— 
s. 103(ab)
Agency
Issuing authority
Family Court  
judges
Federal Court 
judges
Federal Circuit 
Court judges
Nominated AAT 
members
ACC - 2 17 234
ACLEI - - 20 5
AFP 13 105 56 510
CCC (WA) 7 - - 57
CCC (QLD) - - 3 35
ICAC (NSW) - - - 21
NSW CC - - - 349
NSW Police - - 105 1,409
NT Police12 - - 23 20
PIC - - - 35
QLD Police - - 227 77
SA Police13 - 6 15 111
TAS Police - - - 35
vIC Police - - - 188
WA Police 196 - - 104
IBAC - - - 16
ICAC (SA) - - - 6
Total 216 113 466 3,212
12 NT Police has advised the Attorney-General’s Department that the 2012–13 report should be revised to 
note that 21 warrants were issued by AAT members, 2 warrants were issued by Federal Court judges and 
48 by Federal Circuit judges. 
13 SA Police has advised the Attorney-General’s Department that the 2012–13 Report should be revised to 
note that 124 warrants were issued by AAT members, 1 warrant was issued by a Federal Court judge and 
1 warrant was issued by a Federal Circuit Court judge.
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Table 4: Applications for telecommunications interception warrants, telephone interception 
warrants and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(a)-(c) and 100(2)(a)-(c)
Agency Relevant  statistics
Applications for 
warrants
Telephone 
applications for 
warrants14
Renewal 
applications15
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
ACC Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
195
-
195
253
-
253
-
-
-
-
-
-
36
-
36
25
-
25
ACLEI Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
10
-
10
25
-
25
-
-
-
-
-
-
3
-
3
17
-
17
AFP Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
640
6
634
690
6
684
-
-
-
-
-
-
149
-
149
143
-
143
CCC (WA) Made
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
17
-
17
67
3
64
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
23
-
23
CCC (QLD) Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
26
-
26
38
-
38
-
-
-
-
-
-
2
-
2
7
-
7
ICAC (NSW) Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
5
-
5
21
-
21
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
8
-
8
NSW CC Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
417
1
416
349
-
349
-
-
-
-
-
-
105
-
105
71
-
71
NSW Police Made 
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
1,846
7
1,839
1,519
5
1,514
70
1
69
57
-
57
182
-
182
197
-
197
NT Police Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
71
-
71
43
-
43
-
-
-
-
-
-
2
-
2
4
-
4
PIC Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
70
-
70
35
-
35
-
-
-
-
-
-
35
-
35
8
-
8
QLD Police Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
292
-
292
308
4
304
-
-
-
-
-
-
36
-
36
33
-
33
14 Telephone applications are part of the total application of warrants.
15 A renewal is a warrant that is issued for an existing warrant that is still in force.
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Agency Relevant  statistics
Applications for 
warrants
Telephone 
applications for 
warrants14
Renewal 
applications15
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
SA Police16 Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
126
-
126
132
-
132
-
-
-
3
-
3
6
-
6
9
-
9
TAS Police Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
23
-
23
35
-
35
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
6
-
6
vIC Police Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
233
1
232
188
-
188
19
-
19
15
-
15
21
-
21
7
-
7
WA Police Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
276
-
276
300
-
300
1
-
1
-
-
-
28
-
28
44
-
44
IBAC Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
-
-
-
16
-
16
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
ICAC (SA) Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
-
-
-
6
-
6
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Total Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
4,247
15
4,232
4,025
18
4,007
90
1
89
75
-
75
607
-
607
603
-
603
In exceptional circumstances an issuing authority can issue an interception warrant 
that authorises entry on to premises to carry out telecommunications interception. 
An issuing authority can only issue such a warrant if satisfied that it would be 
impracticable or inappropriate to intercept communications by less intrusive means. 
Agencies only use this type of warrant on rare occasions. One warrant was issued in 
2013–14 (see Table 5). 
16 SA Police has advised the Attorney-General’s Department that the 2012–13 figure should be revised up 
from 121 warrants to 126 warrants.
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Table 5: Applications for telecommunications interception warrants authorising entry on 
premises—ss. 100(1)(d) and 100(2)(d)
Agency Relevant statistics
Warrants authorising entry on premises
12/13 13/14
AFP Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
11
-
11
-
-
-
CCC (WA) Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
1
-
1
1
-
1
NSW CC Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
1
-
1
-
-
-
Total Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
13
-
13
1
-
1
An issuing authority can place conditions or restrictions on an interception warrant. 
Figure 1 provides information about the use of warrants issued with conditions or 
restrictions. In 2013–14, 84 interception warrants were issued with a condition or a 
restriction, 25  per cent less than the last reporting period (in 2012–13, 112 warrants 
were issued with a condition or a restriction).
Figure 1: Telecommunications interception warrants issued with specific conditions or 
restrictions—ss. 100(1)(e) and 100(2)(e)
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Effectiveness of telecommunications interception warrants
The information provided in this section should be interpreted with some caution, 
particularly in presuming a relationship between the number of arrests, prosecutions 
(which include committal proceedings) and convictions in a reporting period. An arrest 
recorded in one reporting period may not result in a prosecution until a later reporting 
period. Any resulting conviction could be recorded in that or a subsequent reporting 
period. Additionally, the number of arrests may not equate to the number of charges 
laid as an arrested person may be prosecuted and convicted for a number of offences, 
some or all of which may be prosecuted at a later time. 
The tables may also understate the effectiveness of interception in so far as, in some 
cases, prosecutions may be initiated and convictions recorded, without the need to 
give intercepted information in evidence. In particular, agencies continue to report that 
telecommunications interception effectively enables investigators to identify persons 
involved in and the infrastructure of, organised criminal activities. In many cases, 
the weight of evidence obtained through telecommunications interception results in 
defendants entering guilty pleas, thereby eliminating the need for the intercepted 
information to be introduced into evidence. 
In 2013–14 there were 2,938 arrests, 4,008 prosecutions and 2,210 convictions based on 
lawfully intercepted material.
The following table shows the number of arrests made by law enforcement agencies 
over the past two years on the basis of lawfully intercepted information. 
Table 6: Arrests on the basis of lawfully intercepted information—ss. 102(1)(a) and 102(2)(a)
Agency
Arrests
12/13 13/14
ACC 62 105
ACLEI 6 10
AFP 296 209
CCC (WA) 0 1
CCC (QLD) 32 10
NSW CC 91 139
NSW Police 1,162 1,181
NT Police 58 47
PIC 15 50
QLD Police 537 437
SA Police 109 121
TAS Police 7 57
vIC Police 338 254
WA Police 238 317
Total 2,951 2,938
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CASE STUDY: 
CORRUPTION AND CRIME COMMISSION (WA)
A former detective sergeant with the Western Australia Police Service (WA Police) 
has been jailed in what a magistrate described as ‘particularly serious’ offences 
relating to breaches of the TIA Act.
In 2013–14, the Corruption and Crime Commission of Western Australia 
(the Commission) secured multiple convictions against the former officer, 
including a conviction for contravening the TIA Act’s prohibition for 
communicating interception warrant information.
After a five month investigation by the Commission into offences that 
occurred between 2008 and 2013, the former officer was charged with a total 
of 17 offences. These included one count of unlawful dealing in interception 
warrant information, 15 counts of unlawful use of a restricted-access computer 
system and one count of supplying an audio-visual recording of an interview. 
The former officer was charged in August 2013 and sentenced to nine months 
imprisonment in September 2014. 
The officer was involved in a personal relationship with a lawyer to whom 
he communicated two affidavits: one relating to a telephone interception 
warrant and the other to a surveillance devices warrant, both of which 
contained interception warrant information. The lawyer was not involved in the 
WA Police investigation. 
The Deputy Chief Magistrate noted that the disclosure of the interception 
warrant information had the potential to seriously compromise investigations, 
as the documents would normally be the subject of a non-disclosure order. In 
sentencing the former officer to nine months imprisonment for these offences, 
the Deputy Chief Magistrate acknowledged that any term of imprisonment for a 
former officer ‘would be difficult’ but stated that it was the only way to deal with 
the gravity of the offences. 
The following tables show the number of prosecutions and convictions in which lawfully 
intercepted information was given in evidence by each of the law enforcement agencies. 
More information about the offences listed in these tables is provided at Appendix D.
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Named person warrants
A named person warrant can authorise the interception of telecommunications 
services (such as a landline or mobile service), and in certain circumstances, 
telecommunications devices (such as a mobile handset). Before issuing a named person 
warrant an issuing authority must take into account:
• how much the privacy of any person would be likely to be interfered with 
• the gravity of the offence
• whether the interception will assist in the investigation
• the extent to which methods other than using a named person warrant are 
available to the agency.
The following tables and figures show that in 2013–14, 999 named person warrants 
were issued, a 12 per cent increase from 2012–13. The increase is consistent with 
fluctuations associated with operational demand (between 2011–12 and 2012–13 there 
was a 28 per cent increase in the number of named person warrants issued). 
Table 9: Original applications for named person warrants, telephone applications for named 
person warrants and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(ea) and 100(2)(ea)
Agency Relevant  statistics
Applications for 
named person 
warrants
Telephone 
applications for 
named person 
warrants
Renewal 
applications for 
named person 
warrants
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
ACC Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
124
-
124
168
-
168
-
-
-
-
-
-
30
-
30
22
-
22
ACLEI Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
3
-
3
4
-
4
-
-
-
-
-
-
2
-
2
1
-
1
AFP Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
290
5
285
318
3
315
-
-
-
-
-
-
96
-
96
106
-
106
CCC (WA) Made
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
3
-
3
2
-
2
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
CCC (QLD) Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
9
-
9
13
-
13
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
6
-
6
NSW CC Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
96
-
96
145
-
145
-
-
-
-
-
-
19
-
19
32
-
32
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Agency Relevant  statistics
Applications for 
named person 
warrants
Telephone 
applications for 
named person 
warrants
Renewal 
applications for 
named person 
warrants
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
NSW 
POLICE
Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
132
-
132
105
-
105
-
-
-
-
-
-
27
-
27
25
-
25
NT POLICE Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
2
-
2
3
-
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
PIC Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
3
-
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
-
-
-
QLD POLICE Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
42
-
42
42
1
41
-
-
-
-
-
-
7
-
7
6
-
6
SA POLICE Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
32
-
32
25
-
25
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
-
-
-
TAS POLICE Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
1
-
1
9
-
9
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
4
-
4
vIC POLICE Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
69
-
69
44
-
44
1
-
1
1
-
1
8
-
8
1
-
1
WA POLICE Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
94
-
94
117
-
117
-
-
-
-
-
-
15
-
15
26
-
26
IBAC Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
-
-
-
8
-
8
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
Total Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
900
5
895
1,003
4
999
1
-
1
1
-
1
208
-
208
231
-
231
Under the TIA Act, issuing authorities can issue a warrant with conditions and 
restrictions about interceptions under the warrant. In 2013–14, 17 named person 
warrants were issued with a condition or restriction. In 2012–13, 12 named person 
warrants were issued with conditions or restrictions. 
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Figure 2: Named person warrants issued with conditions or restrictions—ss. 100(1)(ea) and 
100(2)(ea) 
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Consistent with the last reporting period, in 2013–14 the majority of named person 
warrants were for the interception of between two to five telecommunications services. 
Table 10: Number of services intercepted under named person warrants—ss. 100(1)(eb) and 
100(2)(eb)
Agency
Relevant statistics
1 service only 2 – 5 services 6 – 10 services 10+ services
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
ACC 31 47 63 106 20 12 6 -
ACLEI - 2 3 2 - - - -
AFP 61 44 133 195 27 23 7 2
CCC (WA) - - 1 1 1 - 1 1
CCC (QLD) 1 5 8 6 - 2 - -
NSW CC 34 51 57 82 2 8 3 1
NSW Police 31 29 64 59 11 11 - -
NT Police - - 1 1 1 1 - 1
PIC - - - - - - 3 -
QLD Police 8 8 29 27 3 6 2 -
SA Police 5 4 22 18 7 2 - -
TAS Police - - - 7 - 2 1 -
vIC Police 11 8 54 32 4 4 - -
WA Police 20 33 66 74 8 10 - -
IBAC - - - 6 - 2 - -
Total 202 231 501 616 84 83 23 5
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In 2013–14, a total of 2,745 telecommunications services were intercepted under 
service-based named person warrants. 
Figure 3: Total number of services intercepted under service-based name person warrants—
ss. 100(1)(ec) and 100(2)(ec)
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Table 11: Total number of services and devices intercepted under device-based named 
person warrants—ss. 100(1)(ec) and 100(2)(ec)
Agency
Services Devices
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
ACC - - 17 19
AFP - - 66 60
NSW CC - 1 2 5
NSW Police 32 10 26 13
Total 32 11 111 97
Under the TIA Act, agencies can apply for a named person warrant in relation to 
telecommunications devices, where a device or devices of interest can be identified. 
Table 11 shows, consistent with previous years, that in 2013–14 device-based named 
person warrants were used by only a few agencies. 
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B-Party warrants
Definition
A ‘B-Party warrant’ is a warrant that enables an interception agency to intercept 
the communications of a person who is communicating with a person suspected 
of involvement in a serious offence.
An issuing authority can issue a B-Party warrant, but only if there are no other 
practicable methods of identifying the telecommunications services of the person 
involved in the offences, or if interception of communications from that person’s 
telecommunications services would not otherwise be possible.
Table 12 shows that in 2013–14, 139 B-Party warrants were issued, around 16 per cent 
more than in 2012–13. Around 10 per cent of those warrants were issued with conditions 
on restrictions (see Table 12). 
Table 12: Applications for B-Party warrants, telephone applications for B-Party warrants, 
and renewal applications—ss. 100(1)(ed) and 100(2)(ed)
Agency Relevant statistics
Applications for 
B-Party warrants
Telephone 
applications for 
B-Party warrants
Renewal 
applications for 
B-Party warrants
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
ACC Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
1
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
ACLEI Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
2
-
2
11
-
11
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
10
-
10
AFP Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
34
-
34
62
-
62
-
-
-
-
-
-
21
-
21
18
-
18
CCC (WA) Made
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
3
-
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
NSW CC Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
1
-
1
6
-
6
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
NSW Police Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
71
1
70
57
-
57
20
1
19
8
-
8
4
-
4
-
-
-
SA Police Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
-
-
-
3
-
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
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Agency Relevant statistics
Applications for 
B-Party warrants
Telephone 
applications for 
B-Party warrants
Renewal 
applications for 
B-Party warrants
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
QLD Police Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
6
-
6
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
vIC Police Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
2
-
2
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
WA Police Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
1
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Total Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
121
1
120
139
-
139
20
1
19
8
-
8
26
-
26
30
-
30
Table 13: B-Party warrants issued with conditions or restrictions—ss. 100(1)(ed)  
and 100(2)(ed)
Agency
Applications for B-Party warrants
12/13 13/14
ACLEI 2 11
AFP 3 -
NSW Police 1 2
Total 6 13
Duration of warrants
Under the TIA Act, a telecommunications interception warrant, other than a B-Party 
warrant, can be in force for up to 90 days. Under section 57, the chief executive of an 
agency may revoke a warrant at any time and must revoke a warrant if they are satisfied 
that the conditions for issuing the warrant no longer exist. Table 14 sets out the average 
length of time for which interception warrants—including renewals, but not including 
B-Party warrants—were issued and the average length of time they were in force.
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Table 14: Duration of original and renewal telecommunications interception warrants—ss. 
101(1)(a)-(d) and 101(2)(a)-(d)
Agency
Duration of original telecommunications 
interception warrants
Duration of renewal of 
telecommunications  
interception warrants
Average period 
specified in 
warrants (days)
Average period 
warrants in force 
(days)
Average period 
specified in 
warrants (days)
Average period 
warrants in force 
(days)
ACC 88 51 90 58
ACLEI 77 62 64 57
AFP 80 49 90 74
CCC (WA) 59 48 69 46
CCC (QLD) 69 60 85 70
ICAC (NSW) 86 64 80 57
NSW CC 53 89 86 71
NSW Police 67 48 72 56
NT Police 87 56 90 82
PIC 70 85 65 62
QLD Police 61 43 61 56
SA Police 81 63 84 66
TAS Police 55 46 60 56
vIC Police 79 56 90 54
WA Police 89 54 90 56
ICAC (SA) 57 35 - -
IBAC 86 72 90 -
Average 73 58 79 61
Under the TIA Act, a B-Party warrant can be in force for up to 45 days. The following 
table sets out the average length of time for which B-Party warrants and renewals of 
those warrants were issued and the average length of time they were in force.
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Table 15: Duration of original and renewal B-Party warrants—ss. 101(1)(da) and 101(2)(da)
Agency
Duration of original telecommunications 
B-Party warrants
Duration of renewal of 
telecommunications  
B-Party warrants
Average period 
specified in 
warrants (days)
Average period 
warrants in force  
(days)
Average period 
specified in 
warrants (days)
Average period 
warrants in force  
(days)
ACLEI 45 45 45 42
AFP 41 32 45 43
NSW CC 44 44 45 45
NSW Police 36 24 - -
SA Police 44 32 44 32
Average 42 35 45 41
A final renewal means a telecommunications interception warrant that is the last 
renewal of an original warrant. A final renewal is recorded as the number of days 
after the issue of the original warrant that the last renewal of the warrant ceases to 
be in force. 
The categories of final renewals are:
• 90 day final renewal—a last renewal that ceases to be in force more than 90 days 
but not more than 150 days after the date of issue of the original warrant
• 150 day final renewal—a last renewal that ceases to be in force more than 
150 days but not more than 180 days after the date of issue of the original 
warrant
• 180 day final renewal—a last renewal that ceases to be in force more than 
180 days after the date of issue of the original warrant.
Table 16 provides information on the number of final renewals used by agencies.
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Table 16: Number of final renewals—ss. 101(1)(e) and 101(2)(e)
Agency
90 days 150 days 180 days
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
ACC17 9 9 9 9 8 1
ACLEI - - - 1 1 3
AFP 22 64 4 2 28 23
CCC (QLD) 1 - 1 - - 2
ICAC (NSW) 1 1 - 2 - 2
NSW CC 5 12 19 27 24 15
NSW Police 72 79 25 48 14 34
PIC - 4 28 - - 3
QLD Police 14 14 12 4 1 3
SA Police 2 6 - - - 1
TAS Police - 5 - - - -
NT Police - - - 1 - -
CCC (WA) - 6 - 1 - 2
vIC Police 8 2 - - - -
WA Police 9 - 17 30 1 1
Total 143 202 115 125 77 90
Eligible warrants
Definition
An ‘eligible warrant’ is a warrant that was in force during the reporting period 
—not necessarily a warrant that was issued during the reporting period—
where a prosecution was instituted or was likely to be instituted on the basis of 
information obtained by interceptions under the warrant.
Table 17 indicates what percentage of each agency’s total warrants in force during the 
reporting period were eligible warrants. 
Table 17 sets out the number of eligible warrants issued to agencies during the 
reporting period and the percentage of warrants issued to agencies that were 
eligible warrants. 
17 The ACC has provided revised figures for the 2012–13 reporting period. Table 13 provides these 
new figures.
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Table 17: Percentage of eligible warrants—ss. 102(3) and 102(4)
Agency
Total number of 
warrants
Number of eligible 
warrants
%
ACC 192 124 65
ACLEI 32 8 25
AFP 458 245 53
CCC (WA) 66 37 56
CCC (QLD) 42 15 36
ICAC (NSW) 21 7 33
NSW CC 411 366 89
NSW Police 1,579 1,222 77
NT Police 50 22 44
PIC 35 13 37
QLD Police 337 322 96
SA Police 132 87 66
TAS Police 34 24 71
vIC Police 205 150 73
IBAC 16 10 63
ICAC (SA) 6 3 50
WA Police 339 191 56
TOTAL 3,955 2,846 72
Interception without a warrant
Under the TIA Act, agencies can undertake interception without a warrant in limited 
circumstances, for example, where there is a serious threat to life or the possibility of 
serious injury. Table 18a reports on interceptions under subsection 7(5) of the TIA Act, 
which relates to situations where the person to whom the communication is directed 
consents to the interception. Table 18b reports on subsection 7(4) of the TIA Act, which 
relates to situations where an officer of the agency undertaking the interception is a 
party to the communication. There were no interceptions under subsection 7(4) of the 
TIA Act in 2011–12 and 2012–13.
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Table 18a: Interception without a warrant—s. 102A
Agency
Consent where person likely to receive communication from person who has:
Committed an act 
that has or may 
result in loss of  
life or serious 
personal injury
Threatened to kill 
or seriously injure 
another
Threatened to  
cause serious 
damage to property
Threatened to take, 
endanger, or create 
serious threat to 
own life/safety
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
AFP - - 1 5 - - - -
Total - - 1 5 - - - -
Table 18b: Interception without a warrant—s. 102A
Agency
Agency is a party to the communication and has reasonable grounds for  
believing person likely to receive communication from person who has:
Committed an act 
that has or may 
result in loss of  
life or serious 
personal injury
Threatened to kill 
or seriously injure 
another
Threatened to  
cause serious 
damage to property
Threatened to take, 
endanger, or create 
serious threat to 
own life/safety
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
AFP - - - 5 - - - -
NSW Police - - - - - - - 1
Total - - - 5 - - - 1
Mutual assistance
Section 102B of the TIA Act requires that the annual report include information about 
the number of occasions on which lawfully intercepted information or interception 
warrant information was provided to a foreign country under paragraph 68(1) or section 
68A of the TIA Act in connection with an authorisation made under subsection 13A(1) of 
the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987. Consistent with the 2012–13 reporting 
period, agencies reported that no information was provided under these provisions in 
2013–14. 
Number of interceptions carried out on behalf of other agencies
The TIA Act supports the ability of interception agencies to cooperate and to work 
collaboratively by enabling one interception agency to carry out interception on behalf of 
other agencies. Typically this occurs when a larger agency assists a smaller agency to 
intercept to reduce the costs of the smaller agency.
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Table 19: Number of interceptions carried out on behalf of other agencies—s. 103(ac)
Interception carried out by: Interception carried out on behalf of: Number of interceptions:
ACC ACLEI 10
ACC CCC (QLD) 49
AFP ACLEI 40
NSW Police NSW CC 1
vIC Police TAS Police 40
IBAC ICAC (SA) 3
Total 143
Telecommunications interception expenditure
Table 20 below provides information about the total expenditure (including expenditure of 
a capital nature) by interception agencies on telecommunications interception warrants 
and the average expenditure (total warrant expenditure divided by the number of warrants 
issued) per warrant. The average cost per warrant is significantly affected by capital 
expenditure (which can vary significantly, for instance, due to a capital upgrade program) 
and the number of warrants issued, meaning that smaller interception agencies typically 
have higher average costs as they apply for less warrants. 
Table 20: Total expenditure incurred by each agency in connection with the execution of 
telecommunications interception warrants and Average expenditure per telecommunications 
interception warrant—ss. 103(a) and 103(aa)
Agency Total expenditure ($) Average expenditure ($)
ACC 7,210,000 28,498
ACLEI 787,497 31,500
AFP 10,541,869 15,412
CCC (WA) 1,431,412 22,366
CCC (QLD) 1,493,116 39,293
IBAC 1,454,405 90,900
ICAC (NSW) 252,289 12,014
NSW CC 3,072,249 8,803
NSW Police 6,805,841 4,495
NT Police 925,139 21,515
PIC 1,498,153 42,804
QLD Police 4,741,294 15,596
ICAC (SA) 45,420 7,570
SA Police 2,961,807 22,438
TAS Police 557,000 15,914
vIC Police 6,670,207 35,480
WA Police 3,467,883 11,560
2 8  |  T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S  I N T E R C E P T I O N  A N D  A C C E S S  A C T  1 9 7 9  A n n u a l  R e p o r t  2 0 13 –14 
Table 21 provides a breakdown of the total recurrent costs of interception over the 
reporting period. As agencies do not necessarily treat or record particular items of 
expenditure in the same way, caution should be exercised in comparing costs incurred 
by individual agencies. 
Table 21: Recurrent costs of interceptions per agency
Agency Salaries
Administrative 
support
Capital 
expenditure
Interception 
costs
Total ($)
ACC18 5,877,274 158,635 192,224 980,807 7,208,940
ACLEI 611,203 140,820 - 35,473 787,496
AFP 8,103,605 174,597 1,760,955 502,712 10,541,869
CCC (WA) 1,046,391 7,906 296,853 80,262 1,431,412
CCC (QLD) 928,879 132,054 - 432,182 1,493,115
ICAC (NSW) 194,563 - - 57,726 252,289
NSW CC 2,033,475 - 345,056 693,718 3,072,249
NSW Police 5,252,529 118,379 - 1,434,933 6,805,841
NT Police 672,126 - 123,459 129,554 925,139
PIC 1,248,038 - - 250,115 1,498,153
QLD Police 3,097,332 614,886 281,380 747,695 4,741,293
SA Police 2,302,870 261,661 198,581 198,695 2,961,807
TAS Police 400,000 50,000 60,000 47,000 557,000
vIC Police 5,370,790 241,491 59,048 998,878 6,670,207
IBAC 1,122,373 54,962 93,200 183,870 1,454,405
ICAC (SA) 3,840 - 17,280 24,300 45,420
WA Police 3,099,492 204,757 - 163,634 3,467,883
Emergency service facilities
Table 22 sets out the number of places that have been declared under the TIA Act to 
be emergency service facilities. Under the TIA Act, listening to or recording calls to 
and from a facility declared by the Minister to be an emergency service facility is not 
interception. This exemption ensures that emergency services can assist emergency 
callers and respond to critical situations as quickly as possible, without the need to 
first obtain a caller’s consent to recording of the call.
18 The ACC has advised the Attorney-General’s Department that the 2012–13 recurrent cost should be 
revised up from a total amount of $6,586,933 to $6,640,761.
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Table 22: Emergency service facility declarations
State/territory Police Fire brigade Ambulance
Emergency 
services 
authority
Despatching
New South Wales 8 97 7 - 4
victoria 18 - 30 3 22
Queensland 21 12 6 - 12
Western Australia 1 2 2 2 4
South Australia 3 2 1 - 3
Tasmania 1 2 1 - 2
Australian Capital Territory 3 - - - 3
Northern Territory 2 - 1 1 4
Total 57 115 48 6 54
Safeguards, controls and reporting requirements
The TIA Act contains a number of safeguards, controls and reporting requirements 
in relation to interception, access to stored communications and disclosure of 
telecommunications data including: 
• the heads of interception agencies provide the Secretary of the Attorney-
General’s Department (AGD) with a copy of each telecommunications 
interception warrant 
• interception agencies report to the Attorney-General, within three months of a 
warrant ceasing to be in force, detailing the use made of information obtained by 
the interception 
• the Secretary of the AGD maintains a General Register detailing the particulars 
of all telecommunications interception warrants. The Secretary of the AGD must 
provide the General Register to the Attorney-General for inspection every three 
months 
• the Secretary of the AGD maintains a Special Register recording the details of 
telecommunications interception warrants that do not lead to a prosecution 
within three months of the warrant expiring. The Special Register is also given to 
the Attorney-General to inspect.
Law enforcement agencies’ use of interception powers under the TIA Act is independently 
overseen by the Commonwealth Ombudsman and equivalent state bodies. 
At least twice a year the Commonwealth Ombudsman must inspect the records kept by 
the ACC, ACLEI and the AFP relating to interceptions and the use, dissemination and 
destruction of intercepted information. 
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The Commonwealth Ombudsman is required under the TIA Act to report to the 
Attorney-General about these inspections, including information about any deficiencies 
identified and remedial action. 
State and Territory legislation imposes similar requirements on State and Territory 
interception agencies regarding their use of interception powers.
While the Commonwealth Ombudsman is responsible for inspecting the records of 
the ACC, ACLEI and the AFP in relation to interception, the relevant state or territory 
Ombudsman generally undertakes this function for State and Territory agencies. The 
reports of the inspections of the declared state and territory agencies are given to 
the responsible state or territory Minister who provides a copy to the Commonwealth 
Attorney-General.
The Commonwealth Ombudsman also conducts regular inspections of records in 
relation to access by enforcement agencies (including both Commonwealth and state 
agencies) to stored communications and reports to the Attorney-General on the results 
of those inspections.
Commonwealth Ombudsman—inspection of 
telecommunications interception records
During the reporting period the Commonwealth Ombudsman conducted six 
inspections of the interception records of the ACC, ACLEI and the AFP (two inspections 
for each agency). 
The Ombudsman found that there continued to be a high level of compliance with the 
telecommunications interception provisions of the TIA Act and that agencies were 
cooperative with inspections and receptive to suggestions for improvement. 
Overall, the Ombudsman considered that agencies demonstrated a good understanding 
of the Act’s requirements, with all agencies found to be compliant with the majority 
of the Ombudsman’s inspection criteria. The Ombudsman’s inspection criteria (see 
Figures 4 and 5) are:
• Were restricted records properly destroyed (s79)?
• Were the requisite documents kept in connection with the issue of warrants 
(s80)? 
• Were warrants properly applied for and in the correct form (s49)?
• Were the requisite records kept in connection with interceptions (s81)?
• Were interceptions conducted in accordance with the warrants (s7) and was 
any unlawfully intercepted information properly dealt with (s63)?
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Commonwealth Ombudsman’s summary of findings
Table 23: Summary of findings from the two inspections conducted at each agency during the 
reporting period
Criteria ACC ACLEI AFP
Ss7 and 63 – Interceptions conducted in 
accordance with warrant, any unlawful 
information properly dealt with
Nothing to indicate 
otherwise
Nothing to indicate 
otherwise, with one 
exception19
Nothing to indicate 
otherwise
S49 – Warrants in the correct form Compliant except 
for issues noted20
Compliant, except 
for issue noted21
Compliant except 
for issues noted22
S79 – Restricted records properly 
destroyed 
Compliant Not assessed as no 
records destroyed
Not assessed as no 
records destroyed
S80 – Requisite records kept in 
connection with issue of warrant
Compliant, except 
for issue noted23
Compliant Compliant, except 
for issue noted24
S81 – Requisite records kept in 
connection with interceptions
Compliant Compliant Compliant, except 
for issue noted25 
Further information about the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s telecommunications 
interception inspection criteria is outlined in Figure 4 and 5 below. 
Commonwealth Ombudsman’s findings for individual agency
ACC 
No recommendations were made as a result of either of the two inspections of the ACC. 
The Ombudsman acknowledged the commitment of the ACC to ensuring and improving 
agency compliance with TIA Act. In April 2014, the ACC introduced a compulsory online 
e-Learning module that staff will be required to undertake prior to being able to apply 
the provisions of the TIA Act. 
19 Intercepted information from one warrant was not quarantined after ACLEI identified that the 
telecommunications number was no longer being used by the person listed on the warrant. ACLEI advised 
the Ombudsman it has taken measures to address this.
20 Two warrants had minor errors. The ACC self-disclosed that one warrant was not issued for a serious 
offence as it was not an ACC special investigation, one warrant referred to serious offences not listed in the 
affidavit and two warrants stated incorrect expiry dates. All self-disclosed warrants were voluntarily revoked.
21 Four warrants referred to ‘issuing authority’ rather than eligible Judge or nominated AAT member.
22 In eight instances, one self-disclosed and voluntarily revoked, warrants were not in the prescribed form. 
The AFP has advised the Ombudsman that training is ongoing. The AFP self-disclosed that two warrants 
were issued for longer than 90 days and one warrant was issued without an issue date. These warrants 
were voluntarily revoked.
23 A new warrant was given the same warrant number as the warrant it replaced. The ACC subsequently 
informed the Attorney-General’s Department about the additional warrant.
24 In one instance, only a certified copy of the warrant was kept on file.
25 In one instance, the particulars relating to the use of legally intercepted information were not kept.
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ACLEI
No recommendations were made as a result of either of the two inspections of ACLEI. 
The Ombudsman noted in relation to one warrant that interception continued ten 
days after the carrier subscribed the telecommunications number to a different 
person (it appears the carrier did not advise ACLEI of the change). Initially, intercepted 
information not associated with the target was not quarantined and was still available 
to investigators. The Ombudsman reported that ACLEI advised that the information 
was not provided to investigators or used during ACLEI hearings and following the 
Ombudsman’s inspection was quarantined. ACLEI advised the Ombudsman that it has 
since addressed this issue. 
AFP
No recommendations were made as a result of either of the two inspections of the AFP. 
The Ombudsman noted several instances where warrants were not in the 
prescribed form. The Ombudsman reported that in conjunction with ongoing training, 
the AFP was reviewing the prescribed forms to ensure key areas to be completed in the 
form were clear. 
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Figure 4: Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Telecommunications Interception Inspection Criteria
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Figure 5: Other matters reportable under s.85
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CHAPTER 2
STORED COMMUNICATIONS
Authorities and bodies that are ‘enforcement agencies’ under the TIA Act can apply to 
an independent issuing authority for a stored communications warrant to investigate a 
‘serious contravention’ of the law. 
Definition
An ‘enforcement agency’ is broadly defined to include all interception agencies as 
well as a body whose functions include administering a law imposing a pecuniary 
penalty or administering a law relating to the protection of the public revenue.
Stored communications include communications such as email, SMS or voice 
messages stored on a carrier’s network. In 2013–14, stored communications 
warrants were issued to several interception agencies and ASIC and Customs. 
Definition
A ‘serious contravention’ includes:
•	 serious offences (offences for which a telecommunications interception 
warrant can be obtained)
•	 offences punishable by imprisonment for a period of at least three years
•	 offences punishable by a fine of least 180 penalty units (currently $30,600) for 
individuals or 900 penalty units (currently $153,000) for non-individuals such 
as corporations.
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Table 24: Applications and telephone applications for stored communications warrants—ss. 
162(1)(a)-(b) and 162(2)(a)-(b)
Agency Relevant statistics
Applications for stored 
communications warrants
Telephone applications for stored 
communications warrants
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
ACC Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
10
-
10
4
-
4
-
-
-
-
-
-
ICAC (NSW) Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
-
-
-
3
-
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
AFP Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
44
-
44
39
-
39
-
-
-
-
-
-
ASIC Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
-
-
-
3
-
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
CCC (WA) Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
-
-
-
1
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
CCC (QLD) Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
1
-
1
1
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
CUSTOMS Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
8
-
8
12
-
12
-
-
-
-
-
-
NSW CC Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
3
-
3
8
-
8
-
-
-
-
-
-
NSW Police Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
233
-
233
233
-
233
-
-
-
1
-
1
NT Police Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
15
-
15
5
-
5
-
-
-
-
-
-
PIC Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
4
-
4
4
-
4
-
-
-
-
-
-
QLD Police Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
101
-
101
107
1
106
-
-
-
-
-
-
SA Police Made 
Refused/withdrawn 
Issued
11
-
11
21
-
21
-
-
-
-
-
-
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Agency Relevant statistics
Applications for stored 
communications warrants
Telephone applications for stored 
communications warrants
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
TAS Police Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
47
-
47
52
-
52
-
-
-
-
-
-
vIC Police Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
26
-
26
47
-
47
-
-
-
-
-
-
WA Police Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
59
1
58
32
-
32
1
-
1
-
-
-
Total Made
Refused/withdrawn
Issued
562
1
561
572
1
571
1
-
1
1
-
1
Effectiveness of stored communications warrants
In 2013–14 law enforcement agencies made 153 arrests, conducted 176 
proceedings and obtained 144 convictions based on evidence obtained under stored 
communications warrants.
Table 25: Number of arrests, proceedings and convictions made on the basis of lawfully 
accessed information—s. 163(a)-(b)
Agency
Arrests Proceedings Convictions
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
ACC 1 15 - 8 - -
AFP 18 23 12 19 3 1
ASIC - - - - 3 -
CCC (WA) - - - 2 - 2
CUSTOMS - 4 - 1 - 1
NSW Police 56 51 123 138 46 121
NT Police 6 2 - - - -
QLD Police 18 23 4 - 4 -
TAS Police 15 1 6 1 5 1
vIC Police 10 21 5 3 4 16
WA Police 8 13 2 4 - 2
Total 132 153 152 176 65 144
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In 2012–13 law enforcement agencies made 132 arrests, conducted 152 prosecutions 
and obtained 65 convictions based on evidence obtained under stored communications 
warrants. 
Care should be taken in interpreting Table 25 as an arrest recorded in one reporting 
period may not result in a prosecution (if any) until a later reporting period. Any 
resulting conviction may be recorded in that or an even later reporting period. 
Preservation notices
Under Part 3-1A of Chapter 3 of the TIA Act, certain agencies can give a preservation 
notice to a carrier requiring the carrier to preserve all stored communications held 
that relate to the person or telecommunications service specified in the notice. The 
carrier is required to keep the stored communications while the notice is in force, which 
allows a period of time for enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant to access them. 
The purpose of the preservation notice is to prevent the communications from being 
destroyed before an agency can obtain a warrant to access the information. 
The TIA Act provides for two types of preservation notices: 
• domestic preservation notices—which cover stored communications that might 
relate either to a contravention of certain Australian laws or to security
• foreign preservation notices—which cover stored communications that might 
relate to a contravention of certain foreign laws. Only the AFP can give a foreign 
preservation notice to a carrier. The AFP can only issue a notice if a foreign 
country has requested the preservation of stored communications that relate to 
the contravention of certain foreign laws. 
Domestic preservation notices must be revoked if the stored communications relating 
to the person or telecommunications service specified in the notice are no longer 
under investigation. 
Foreign preservation notices must be revoked if 180 days has lapsed since the 
carrier was given the notice and the foreign country has not made a request to the 
Attorney-General for access to those communications in that time period or if the 
Attorney-General refuses the request to access the communications. 
In 2013–14, 1,511 domestic preservation notices and 467 domestic preservation 
revocation notices were issued (see Table 26).
The Ombudsman has functions in relation to preservation notices given by issuing 
agencies (other than the Organisation) and the InspectorGeneral of Intelligence and 
Security has functions in relation to preservation notices given by the Organisation.
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Table 26: Domestic preservation notices—s. 161A(1)
Agency
Domestic preservation  
notice  issued
Domestic preservation notice 
revocations  issued
ACC 40 2
AFP 170 79
ASIC 143 4
CCC (WA) 1 -
CCC (QLD) 33 7
NSW ICAC 8 -
NSW CC 7 1
NSW Police 318 55
NT Police 36 16
PIC 8 -
QLD Police 353 136
SA Police 64 43
TAS Police 133 85
vIC Police 75 11
CUSTOMS 23 1
ACLEI 9 4
WA Police 90 23
Total 1,511 467
Under section 161A(2) of the TIA Act the AFP is required to report on foreign preservation 
notices. In 2013–14, the AFP reported that six foreign preservation notices and no foreign 
preservation notice revocation notices were issued.
Mutual assistance
The Cybercrime Legislation Amendment Act 2012 along with the Extradition and Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation Amendment Act 2012 inserted reporting 
requirements into the TIA Act about mutual assistance requests. These requirements 
have been included in this Annual Report.
Table 27: Mutual assistance and stored communications warrants—s. 162(1)(c)
Agency
Number of stored 
communications warrants 
applied for as a result of 
mutual assistance
Number of stored 
communications  
warrants refused
Number of stored 
communications warrants 
issued as a result of mutual 
assistance
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
AFP 6 - - - 6 -
Total 6 - - - 6 -
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Section 163A of the TIA Act provides that the annual report must provide information 
regarding the number of occasions in which lawfully accessed information or stored 
communications warrant information was provided to a foreign country under the 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (the Mutual Assistance Act). In 2013–14 
there were no occasions on which this information was provided to a foreign country 
under the Mutual Assistance Act. 
Commonwealth Ombudsman—inspection of stored 
communications access records
During the reporting period the Commonwealth Ombudsman inspected the preservation 
notices and stored communications access records of 17 enforcement agencies. 
The inspections are on the basis of a full year, and for this reason, the Ombudsman’s 
inspections of the enforcement agencies related to 2012–13 records.
During the 2013–14 inspection period, the Ombudsman noted that agencies have 
implemented the Ombudsman’s previous suggestions and recommendations, 
updating relevant policies and procedures to help staff to comply with the TIA Act. 
The Ombudsman’s inspection criteria are:
1. Were destructions properly conducted (sections 150 and 151(e))?
2. Were records properly kept (sections 150A and 151)?
3. Were preservation notices properly given (sections 107H(2), 107H(3), 107M, 107N, 
and 107S)? 
4. Were preservation notices properly revoked (sections 107L, 107M, 107R and 107S)? 
5. Were warrant applications properly made and warrants in the correct form 
(sections 113, 5E, 6B, 116(1)(d), 116(1)(da), 6DB, 118, and 119(5))?
6. Were warrants properly revoked (sections 122 and 123)?
7. Were conditions and restrictions on warrants adhered to (section 117)?
8. Was the authority of the warrant only exercised by an authorised officer and 
was lawfully accessed information only communicated to authorised officers 
(sections 127(1) and (2), and 135(2))?
9. Were stored communications accessed in accordance with the Act (sections 108, 
117 and 119) and were any unlawfully accessed stored communications properly 
dealt with (section 133)?
Overall 
During 2013–14, the Ombudsman noted that most agencies displayed a positive 
attitude towards compliance and had adopted the Ombudsman’s suggestions from 
2012–13. In particular, the Ombudsman noted that agencies have implemented 
measures to assure themselves that they are only dealing with lawfully accessed 
stored communications provided by carriers. 
During this period the Ombudsman also conducted his first inspections of agencies’ 
preservation notice records.
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Record keeping compliance 
Most agencies were assessed as compliant with the record keeping requirements 
relating to preservation notices and stored communications warrants under sections 
150A and 151 of the TIA Act; however the Ombudsman made a small number of formal 
recommendations to agencies that they improve their record keeping procedures. The 
Ombudsman reported that agencies were generally responsive to these recommendations.
Preservation notices
The Ombudsman identified a number of instances where preservation notices were not 
given and revoked in accordance with the TIA Act. As a result, the Ombudsman made 
a number of suggestions to agencies that they improve their processes to improve 
compliance with the TIA Act. The Ombudsman reported that agencies were generally 
responsive to these suggestions.
Destructions 
The Ombudsman reported that most agencies destroyed records under section 150 of 
the TIA Act, but that a number of these agencies were assessed as not compliant with 
certain provisions under section 150.  Issues arose from reports not being submitted 
to the Attorney-General or destructions not occurring in accordance with the TIA Act. 
In some of these instances, the Ombudsman noted that agencies had destroyed the 
information for purposes such as limiting the use and disclosure of accessed stored 
communications.
Applying for warrants
Based on the records made available at four of the inspected agencies, the Ombudsman 
identified deficiencies in the information provided to issuing authorities. Some agencies 
agreed with the Ombudsman’s findings and in response advised of appropriate actions 
while others advised that they were satisfied that sufficient information was provided. 
Dealing with accessed stored communications provided by carriers
During 2013–14, the Ombudsman again identified a number of instances where it 
appeared that stored communications that were not sent to or by the person named 
on the warrant were accessed by carriers and provided to several agencies, and where 
carriers had accessed stored communications after the relevant warrant had already 
expired. The Ombudsman reiterated to agencies the importance of “screening” all 
stored communications they receive from carriers to ensure that they are only dealing 
with lawfully accessed information. 
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Figure 6: Commonwealth Ombudsman—stored communications access inspection criteria
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Figure 7: Commonwealth Ombudsman—preservation notice inspection criteria
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CHAPTER 3
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DATA
Access to telecommunications data is regulated by Chapter 4 of the TIA Act which 
permits enforcement agencies to authorise telecommunications carriers to disclose 
telecommunications data where that information is reasonably necessary for the 
enforcement of the criminal law, a law imposing a pecuniary penalty, or the protection 
of the public revenue. 
Definition
An ‘enforcement agency’ is broadly defined to include all interception agencies as 
well as a body whose functions include administering a law imposing a pecuniary 
penalty or administering a law relating to the protection of the public revenue.
In 2013–14, 77 enforcement agencies made historical data authorisations. 
Access to telecommunications data is a critical tool for investigating criminal offences 
and other activities that threaten community safety and security. 
Definition
‘Telecommunications data’ is information about a communication—such as the 
phone numbers of the people who called each other, how long they talked to 
each other, the email address from which a message was sent and the time the 
message was sent.
Data is often the first source of lead information for further investigations, helping to 
eliminate potential suspects and to support applications for more privacy intrusive 
investigative tools including search warrants and interception warrants. 
Under the TIA Act, all enforcement agencies can access historical data and 
criminal law enforcement agencies can also access prospective data. Disclosure of 
telecommunications data must be approved by an authorised senior officer of the 
relevant enforcement agency. 
Definition
‘Historical data’, also known as ‘existing data’, is information that is 
already in existence when an authorisation for disclosure is received by a 
telecommunications carrier. 
‘Prospective data’ is telecommunications data that comes into existence during a 
period of time in which an authorisation is in force.
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Only agencies recognised under the Act as being a ‘criminal law enforcement agency’ 
can authorise the disclosure of prospective data. During the reporting period, a 
‘criminal law enforcement agency’ meant all interception agencies and Customs. 
A criminal law-enforcement agency can only authorise the disclosure of prospective 
data when disclosure is considered to be reasonably necessary for the investigation 
of an offence punishable by imprisonment for at least three years. A prospective data 
authorisation comes into force once the relevant telecommunications service provider 
receives the request and is effective for 45 days or less. 
Existing data—enforcement of a criminal law
Tables 28, 29, 30 and 31 provide information on agency use of historical data 
authorisations to enforce the criminal law.
Table 28: Number of authorisations made by a Law Enforcement Agency for access to existing 
information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—s. 186(1)(a)
Agency
Authorisations
12/13 13/14
ACC 3,789 5,447
ACLEI 2,594 2,244
AFP 25,582 21,358
CCC (WA) 1,538 1,804
CCC (QLD) 7,646 10,896
IBAC 20 321
ICAC (NSW) 575 933
NSW CC 3,120 3,294
NSW Police 119,705 111,889
NT Police 3,308 10,182
OPI 71 -
PIC 1,771 1,475
QLD Police 41,120 35,663
SA Police 9,119 8,504
TAS Police 8,701 9,921
vIC Police 64,458 63,325
ICAC (SA) - 16
WA Police 19,812 27,315
Total 312,929 314,587
In 2013–14, enforcement agencies made 324,260 data authorisations to enforce the criminal 
law. This was an increase of 4,228 or 1.3 per cent from the previous reporting period.
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CASE STUDY:  
AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE
Telecommunications data has played a pivotal  
role in bringing to justice an individual involved with 
child exploitation. 
In February 2014, the Australian Federal Police received 
information regarding a person suspected of uploading suspicious photographs 
to an image-sharing website. Two different IP addresses were used by the 
suspect and requests were submitted to the relevant telecommunications 
companies to identify the users of the IPs. Data was not available for 
one of the IP addresses; however, data relating to the second IP address 
identified a subscriber and a location. The subscriber details provided by the 
telecommunications company gave police sufficient information to obtain search 
warrants, which led to the discovery of a large volume of child pornography 
material and information indicating possible abuse. The individual in possession 
of the material was subsequently arrested.
CASE STUDY:  
VICTORIA POLICE
Telecommunications data has provided 
victoria Police with the information to bring 
about the successful arrest and prosecution 
of individuals involved in a series of 
previously unsolved crimes.
In 2012, a person was the target of sustained 
racially motivated violence which included the fire-bombing of the victim’s 
business on two occasions. Although the victim was able to suggest a suspect 
police did not have enough evidence to arrest that person. CCTv footage of both 
fire bombings identified the vehicle used by the offender/s. The same vehicle 
was found burnt out the day after the owner had reported to police that the 
vehicle had been stolen. The crimes remained unsolved and were handed to an 
investigation team for review during the first half of 2013. 
The investigation team accessed the telecommunications data of the owner of the 
stolen vehicle and analysis of this data revealed that the owner of the stolen car 
had been in contact with the arson suspect during the time his car was stolen, 
and during the times the arson was committed. The data also contradicted the 
statement the vehicle’s owner had made to police about the theft of his vehicle.
Close analysis of the CCTv footage showed that as the offender was in the 
process of lighting the fire, his mobile phone rang in his pocket, causing him to 
turn it off. The time on the CCTv footage and the time of the phone call (based 
on the telecommunications data received) showed that the owner of the vehicle 
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made a hangup call to the offender at the exact moment the offender grabbed his 
phone and turned it off. Further to this, the call charge records showed that this 
crucial call passed through a cell tower located only 50 to 100 metres from the 
victim’s business. 
The call charge records were used to identify two further suspects from both 
arsons, and exculpated suspects from other violent offences the victim had 
suffered. Information provided by these records resulted in the identified 
offenders being charged with arson and associated offences, and both 
subsequently pleaded guilty to the charges.
Table 29: Number of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Enforcement Agency for access 
to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—s. 186(1)(a)
Agency
Authorisations
12/13 13/14
ACCC 134 10
Australian Fisheries Management Authority 2 3
ASIC 1,336 1,771
Australian Taxation Office 493 277
Civil Aviation Safety Authority 4 -
Customs 3,902 6,196
Dept. of Agriculture 84 84
Dept. of Defence 14 25
Dept. of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs 4 -
Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade 84 -
Dept. of Health 76 38
Dept. of Human Services 1 -
Dept. of Immigration and Border Protection26 158 107
Dept. of Social Services - 1
Dept. of the Environment 9 13
Australian Financial Security Authority 111 128
Total 6,412 8,653
26 The 2012–13 figures have been revised to include information about the Department of Immigration and 
Border Protection. This information was not included in the original report. 
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Table 30: Number of authorisations made by a state or territory enforcement agency for access 
to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—s. 186(1)(a)
Agency
Authorisations
12/13 13/14
Bankstown City Council 5 -
Corrective Services NSW 69 52
Corrections victoria - 389
Dept. of Commerce (WA) 116 78
Dept. of Environment and Primary Industries (vIC) 349 347
Office of Environment & Heritage (NSW) 106 47
RSPCA Queensland 8 -
RSPCA victoria 23 64
Transport Accident Commission (vIC) 1 8
NSW Environment Protection Authority - 5
Workcover NSW - 4
The Hills Shire Council - 1
victorian Workcover Authority 14 25
Total 691 1,020
Table 31: Total number of authorisations made for access to existing information or 
documents in the enforcement of a criminal law—section 186(1)(a)
Agency 
Authorisations
12/13 13/14
No. of authorisations made by a Law Enforcement Agency 312,929 314,587
No. of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Agency27 6,412 8,653
No. of authorisations made by a State or Territory Agency 691 1,020
Total 320,032 324,260
Existing data—enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary 
penalty or protecting public revenue
Tables 32, 33, 34 and 35 provide information on agency use of historical data 
authorisations in the enforcement of a law that imposes a pecuniary penalty or 
protects the public revenue.
27 This figure has been revised to include information from the Department of Immigration and 
Border Protection.
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In 2013–14, enforcement agencies made 10,398 data authorisations to enforce a law 
that imposes a pecuniary penalty or protects the public revenue. This was a decrease of 
368 authorisations or 3.4 per cent from the previous reporting period.
Table 32: Number of authorisations made by a law enforcement agency for access to existing 
information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or the 
protection of the public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)
Agency 
Authorisations
12/13 13/14
AFP 99 36
NSW Police 6,300 5,324
NT Police 2 4
QLD Police 110 239
SA Police - 2
CCC (QLD) - 11
TAS Police 67 764
Total 6,578 6,380
Table 33: Number of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Enforcement Agency for 
access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary 
penalty or the protection of the public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)
Agency 
Authorisations
12/13 13/14
ACCC 155 31
Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency 20 23
ASIC 114 110
Australian Taxation Office 138 66
Australia Post 375 810
Civil Aviation Safety Authority 3 -
Clean Energy Regulator 1 1
Customs 120 156
Dept. of Agriculture 8 -
Dept. of Defence 127 94
Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade 67 227
Dept. of Health 1 -
Dept. of Human Services 628 339
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Agency 
Authorisations
12/13 13/14
Dept. of Immigration and Border Protection 14 -
Dept. of Social Services - 1
Fair Work Building & Construction 1 7
National Measurement Institute - 1
Tax Practitioners Board 61 -
Total 1,833 1,866
Table 34: Number of authorisations made by a state or territory enforcement agency 
for access to existing information or documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a 
pecuniary penalty or the protection of the public revenue—s. 186(1)(b)
Agency 
Authorisations
12/13 13/14
ACT Revenue Office 6 3
Bankstown City Council 5 7
City of Darebin - 1
Consumer Affairs victoria 187 120
Consumer and Business Services (SA) 209 153
Dept. of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (QLD) 33 25
Dept. of Commerce (WA) 84 87
Dept of Environment and Heritage Protection (QLD) 55 32
Dept. of Environment & Primary Industries (vIC) 51 -
Dept. of Fisheries (WA) 101 113
Dept. of Justice (vIC) - 16
Dept. of Mines And Petroleum (WA) - 2
Dept. of Parks And Wildlife (WA) 87 6
Dept. of Primary Industries (NSW) 197 226
Harness Racing New South Wales 12 7
Harness Racing victoria - 3
Health Care Complaints Commission (NSW) 15 20
Ipswich City Council 6 21
Knox City Council 5 5
Legal Services Board (vIC) - 9
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Agency 
Authorisations
12/13 13/14
NSW Fair Trading 740 758
Office of Fair Trading (QLD) 257 252
Office of Liquor and Gaming Regulation (QLD) 2 3
Office of State Revenue (NSW) 137 127
Office of State Revenue (QLD) 5 1
Office of the Racing Integrity Commissioner (vIC) 15 10
Racing and Wagering Western Australia 10 18
Racing NSW 14 16
Racing Queensland 28 4
Revenue SA 18 17
Roads and Maritime Services (NSW) 4 -
RSPCA South Australia 1 -
RSPCA Queensland - 19
State Revenue Office victoria 40 53
Tasmania Prison Service 15 -
Workcover NSW 1 -
victorian Workcover Authority - 17
Wyndham City Council 15 1
Total 2,355 2,152
Table 35: Total number of authorisations made for access to existing information or 
documents in the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty or protecting public 
revenue—s. 186(1)(b)
Agency 
Authorisations
12/13 13/14
No. of authorisations made by a Law Enforcement Agency 6,578 6,380
No. of authorisations made by a Commonwealth Agency 1,833 1,866
No. of authorisations made by a State or Territory Agency 2,355 2,152
Total 10,766 10,398
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Prospective data—authorisations
Tables 36 and 37 set out information about the use of prospective data authorisations 
during the reporting year.
Table 36: Prospective data authorisations—s. 186(1)(c)
Agency
Number of 
authorisations 
made
Days specified  
in force
Actual days in 
force
Authorisations 
discounted
ACC 1,075 29,774 19,030 73
AFP 1,037 33,691 22,174 145
IBAC 189 8,420 5,601 38
CCC (WA) 47 1,613 1,136 1
CCC (QLD) 394 7,246 6,189 51
CUSTOMS 144 169 163 1
ICAC (NSW) 30 1,350 1,002 1
NSW CC 770 27,849 20,166 75
NSW Police 567 21,484 13,235 33
NT Police 334 15,030 14,534 13
ACLEI 8 66 21 7
PIC 146 5,885 4,741 15
QLD Police 3,857 163,233 127,006 414
SA Police 260 10,995 7,613 19
TAS Police 166 7,470 4,407 17
vIC Police 3,339 48,668 30,666 53
WA Police 752 33,840 24,429 79
Total 13,115 416,783 302,113 1,035
The number of authorisations made by a criminal law-enforcement agency for access 
to specified information or documents that come into existence during the period for 
which an authorisation is in force is continued in Table 37.
The table also outlines the number of days the authorisations were to be in force 
and how many days they were actually in force as well as providing the number of 
authorisations still in force at the end of the reporting period.
Table 38 provides information about the average number of days the authorisations 
were specified to be in force and the average actual number of days they remained 
in force.
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Table 37: Average specified and actual time in force of prospective data authorisations
Agency
Average period specified Average period actual
12/13 13/14 12/13 13/14
ACC 35 28 24 19
ACLEI - 8 - 21
AFP 32 32 27 25
CCC (WA) 41 34 35 25
CCC (QLD) 24 18 20 18
CUSTOMS 1 1 1 1
IBAC 44 45 - 37
ICAC (NSW) 44 45 33 35
NSW CC 36 36 32 29
NSW Police 38 38 25 25
NT Police 45 45 42 45
OPI 44 - 44 -
PIC 41 40 37 36
QLD Police 39 42 32 37
SA Police 41 42 36 32
TAS Police 45 45 29 30
vIC Police 39 15 28 9
WA Police 45 45 30 36
Average 37 33 30 27
Data authorisations to locate missing persons
Under section 178A of the TIA Act, the AFP and state police forces can authorise the 
disclosure of telecommunications data to help find a missing person.
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Table 38: The number of authorisations made for access to existing information or documents 
for the location of missing persons—s. 178A
Agency
Authorisations
12/13 13/14
AFP 45 55
NSW Police 570 1,097
NT Police 17 36
SA Police - 33
TAS Police - 155
QLD Police 263 652
Total 895 2,028
Data authorisations for foreign law enforcement
The TIA Act also requires the AFP to report on data authorisations made in relation to 
foreign law enforcement. In 2013–14, the AFP made 19 data authorisations for access to 
historical information to enforce the criminal law of a foreign country.
Following these requests, the AFP made 17 disclosures to foreign law enforcement 
agencies. Information was disclosed to the following countries: France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong (The Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of 
China), Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka 
and Singapore.
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CHAPTER 4
FURTHER INFORMATION
For further information about the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
please contact the Attorney-General’s Department:
Electronic Surveillance Policy Branch
Attorney-General’s Department
3-5 National Circuit
BARTON ACT 2600  
(02) 6141 2900
More information about telecommunications interception and access and 
telecommunications data access can be found at <www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/
TelecommunicationsSurveillance/Pages/default.aspx.>
Previous copies of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
Annual Report can be accessed online at <www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/
TelecommunicationsSurveillance/Pages/Annualreports.aspx.> 
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APPENDIX B
INTERCEPTION AGENCIES UNDER THE TIA ACT
Commonwealth agency or state eligible authority Date of s.34 declaration
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity Not applicable
Australian Crime Commission Not applicable
Australian Federal Police Not applicable
Corruption and Crime Commission (Western Australia) 26 March 2004
Crime and Corruption Commission (Queensland) 7 July 2009
Independent Broad-based  
Anti-corruption Commission (victoria)
18 December 2012  
(came into force 10 February 2013)
Independent Commission Against Corruption (New South Wales) 6 June 1990
New South Wales Crime Commission 30 January 1989
New South Wales Police Force 30 January 1989
Northern Territory Police 25 October 2006
Police Integrity Commission (New South Wales) 14 July 1998
Queensland Police Service 8 July 2009
Independent Commissioner against Corruption (South Australia)
17 June 2013  
(came into force 1 September 2013)
South Australia Police 10 July 1991
Tasmania Police 5 February 2005
victoria Police 28 October 1988
Western Australia Police 15 July 1997
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APPENDIX C
ABBREvIATIONS
AAT Administrative Appeals Tribunal
ACC Australian Crime Commission
ACCC Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
ACLEI Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity
AFP Australian Federal Police
AGD Attorney-General’s Department
ASIC Australian Securities and Investments Commission
ATO Australian Taxation Office
CAC Communications Access Co-ordinator
CCC (WA) Corruption and Crime Commission (Western Australia)
CCC (QLD) Crime and Corruption Commission (Queensland)
Customs Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
DIBP Department of Immigration and Border Protection
IBAC Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission 
(victoria)
NSW CC New South Wales Crime Commission
ICAC (NSW)  Independent Commission Against Corruption  
(New South Wales)
NSW Police New South Wales Police Force
NT Police Northern Territory Police
OPI Office of Police Integrity (victoria)
PIC Police Integrity Commission (New South Wales)
PIM Public Interest Monitor
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PJCIS Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security
QLD Police Queensland Police Service
ICAC (SA) Independent Commissioner Against Corruption  
(South Australia)
SA Police South Australia Police
TAS Police Tasmania Police
Telecommunications Act Telecommunications Act 1997
TIA Act Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979
vIC Police victoria Police
WA Police Western Australia Police 
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APPENDIX D
CATEGORIES OF SERIOUS OFFENCES
Serious offence category Offences covered
ACC special investigation TIA Act, s5D(1)(f): ACC special investigation
Administration of justice TIA Act, s5D(8)(b): offences against ss35, 36, 36A, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43, 46 
or 47 of the Crimes Act 1914
Assist escape punishment/dispose 
of proceeds
TIA Act, s5D(7): assisting a person to escape punishment or to 
dispose of the proceeds of a serious offence
Bribery or corruption; offences 
against ss131.1, 135.1, 142.1, 142.2, 
148.2, 268.112 of the Criminal Code
TIA Act, s5D(2)(vii), bribery or corruption; TIA Act, s5D(8)(a): offences 
against ss131.1, 135.1, 142.1, 142.2, 148.2 or 268.112 of the Criminal 
Code Act 1995
Cartel offences TIA Act, s5D(5B): cartel offences
Child pornography offences TIA Act, s5D(3B): child pornography offences
Conspire/aid/abet serious offence TIA Act, s5D(6): conspiring to commit or aiding or abetting the 
commission of a serious offence
Cybercrime offences TIA Act, s5D(5): cybercrime offences
Kidnapping TIA Act, s5D(1)(b): kidnapping
Loss of life or personal injury TIA Act, s5D(2)(b)(i) and (ii): serious personal injury, loss of life
Money laundering TIA Act, s5D(4): money laundering
Murder TIA Act, s5D(1)(a): murder
Organised offences and/or  
criminal organisations
TIA Act, s5D(3): offences involving planning and organisation; s5D(8A) 
and (9), criminal organisations
People smuggling and related TIA Act, s5D(3A): people smuggling, slavery, sexual servitude, 
deceptive recruiting, trafficking in persons
Serious damage to property  
and/or serious arson
TIA Act, s5D(2)(b)(iii) and (iiia): serious damage to property, arson
Serious drug offences and/or 
trafficking
TIA Act, s5D(5A); s5D(2)(b)(iv): serious drug offences, drug trafficking; 
TIA Act, s5D(1)(c): import or export border controlled drugs
Serious fraud and/or revenue loss TIA Act, s5D(2)(v) and (vi): serious fraud, serious revenue loss
Telecommunications offences TIA Act, s5D(5)(a): telecommunications offence
Terrorism offences TIA Act, s5D(1)(d), 5D(1)(e): terrorism offences
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